In this paper we develop an approach to measuring inequality and poverty that recognizes the fact that individuals within households may have both di¤erent preferences and di¤erential access to resources. We argue that a measure based on estimates of the sharing rule is inadequate as an approach that seeks to understand how welfare is distributed in the population because it ignores public good and the allocation of time to market work, leisure and household production. We develop a money metric measure of welfare that accounts for public goods (by using personalized prices) household production and for the allocation of time.
1 Introduction: individual and household welfare When dealing with households, the applied welfare literature is faced with an interesting conundrum. On the one hand, what we are (or should be) ultimately interested in is individual welfare. 'Household welfare', if this notion has any sense, cannot be de…ned without considering the welfare of each member.
On the other hand, most empirical measures of welfare stop at the household level. That could have been acceptable if the two approaches were equivalentsay, if there existed a stable, monotonic, one-to-one relationship between household welfare, as measured by the standard approaches, and the welfare of each individual composing the household, so that any reform improving total welfare would automatically improve that of each member in similar proportion.
However, everything we know about household behavior strongly suggests that such an assumption would be plain wrong. From a theoretical perspective, it would imply that 'power' is either distributed across household members in a totally in ‡exible manner, regardless of individual situations, or is irrelevant to intrahousehold allocation of welfare. While both arguments can be found in the literature (the …rst is reminiscent of Samuelson's household welfare index, whereas the second relates to Becker's rotten kid theorem), advances in family economics over the last two decades have essentially been build upon the opposite view -i.e., that intrahousehold allocation of power is crucial for individual welfare, and responds to changes in the environment. From an empirical perspective, moreover, the verdict is clear. Income pooling -a central prediction of the previous approaches -has been systematically rejected; there is ample evi-dence that reforms which alter the balance of power within the household (e.g., by paying a bene…t to the wife instead of the husband) do impact household behavior and individual well-being. Analyzing welfare at the intrahousehold level, however, raises a host of speci…c problems. An obvious di¢ culty is observability. While many data sets report aggregate consumption at the household level, individual consumptions are typically not recorded, at least for most commodities; they have to be recovered. But conceptual problems at least as challenging. A large fraction of household expenditures relate to public commodities -i.e., goods that are jointly consumed by the household, without anyone being excluded; moreover, in many cases these public commodities are internally produced within the household.
Spouses may have di¤erent preferences regarding public goods; therefore, the fraction of household expenditures devoted to public consumption has a potentially important (and di¤erentiated) impact on individual welfare that cannot be ignored. Similar questions arise for intrahousehold production, with the additional twist that time spent by each spouse should also be taken into account.
How should such public productions and consumptions be considered? Can one de…ne a money-metric measure of individual welfare that accounts for the public nature of several consumption goods (and their potentially di¤erentiated impact of the welfare of each individual)? And when would such a measure be empirically identi…able from standard data on household behavior?
The aim of the present article is to provide a new answer to these questions. Obviously, this task …rst requires an explicit model of household decision making that recognizes the existence of (potentially di¤erent) individual preferences and clari…es the notion of 'power'within the household. Furthermore, these goals should be achieved in an empirically tractable way. An acceptable approach must ful…ll a double requirement: testability (i.e., it should generate a set of empirically testable restrictions that fully characterize the model, in the sense that any given behavior is compatible with the model if and only if these conditions are satis…ed) and identi…ability (it should be feasible, possibly under additional assumption, to recover the structure of the model -in our case, individual preferences and welfare) from the sole observation of household behavior. The main candidate, in this respect, is the collective approach.
1 While other (non-unitary) perspectives have been adopted in the literature, none of the alternatives has (so far) convincingly addressed the double requirement of testability and identi…ability just evoked. The next section describes the basic model. We then discuss the conceptual issues linked with intrahousehold inequality, …rst in the case where all commodities are privately consumed, then in the presence of public goods. In the following section, we consider extensions of the model to encompass individualspeci…c prices and domestic production. Finally, we discuss issues related to identi…cation. 2 On the other hand, the collective framework excludes models based on non cooperative game theory (at least in the presence of public good), such as those considered by Ulph of necessary conditions for non cooperative models. However, whether these conditions are su¢ cient is not known; moreover, no general identi…cation result has been derived so far.
Concepts, de…nitions, axioms
In what follows, we consider a K-person household that can consume several commodities; these include standard consumption goods and services, but also leisure, future or contingent goods, etc. Formally, N of these commodities are publicly consumed within the houshold. The market purchase of public good j is denoted Q j ; the N -vector of public goods is given by Q. Similarly, private goods are denoted q i with the n-vector q. Each private goods bought is divided between the members so that member a (a = 1; :::; K) receives q a i of good i, with P a q a i = q i . The vector of private goods that a receives is q a , with
An allocation is a N + Kn-vector Q; q 1 ; :::; q K . The associated market prices are given by the N -vector P and the n-vector p for public and private goods respectively.
We assume that each married person has her or his own preferences over the allocation of family resources. where F a may depend on marital status and on the spouse's characteristics.
Note that the F a s will typically play a crucial role in the decision to marry and in the choice of a partner. However, it is irrelevant for the characterization of individual preferences over consumption bundles.
E¢ ciency has a simple translation -namely, the household behaves as if it was maximizing a weighted sum of utilities of its members. Technically, the program is thus (assuming egotistic preferences):
under the budget constraint: In words: any allocation that is e¢ cient for caring preferences must be ef…cient for the underlying, egotistic felicities. The converse is not true, because a very unequal solution to (P) may fail to be Pareto e¢ cient for caring preferences: transfering resources from well endowed but caring individuals to poorly endowed ones may be Pareto improving. We conclude that any property of the solutions to a program of the form (P) must be satis…ed by any Pareto-e¢ cient allocation with caring preferences.
A major advantage of the formulation (P) is that the Pareto weights have a natural interpretation in terms of respective decision powers. The notion of 'power' in households may be di¢ cult to de…ne formally, even in a simpli…ed framework like ours. Still, it seems natural to expect that when two people bargain, a person's gain increases with the person's power. This somewhat hazy notion is captured very e¤ectively by the Pareto weights. Clearly, if a in (P) is zero then a has no say on the …nal allocation, while if a is large (close to 1 in our normalization) then a e¤ectively gets her way. A key property of (P) is precisely that increasing will result in a move along the Pareto set, in the direction of higher utility for a. If we restrict ourselves to economic considerations, we may thus consider that the Pareto weight a 're ‡ects' a's power, in the sense that a larger a corresponds to more power (and better outcomes) being enjoyed by a.
If Q (p; P; y) ; q 1 (p; P; y) ; :::; q K (p; P; y) denotes the solution to (P), we de…ne the collective indirect utlity of a as the utility reached by a at the end of the decision process; formally:
Note that, unlike the unitary setting, in the collective framework a member's collective indirect utility depends not only on the member's preferences but also on the decision process (hence the adjective 'collective'). This notion is crucial for welfare analysis, as we shall see below.
Finally, an important concept is the notion of distribution factors. A distribution factor is any variable that (i) does not a¤ect preferences or the budget constraint, but (ii) may in ‡uence the decision process, therefore the Pareto weights. Think, for instance, of a bargaining model in which the agents'respective threat points may vary. A change in the threat point of one member will typically in ‡uence the outcome of the bargaining process, even if the household's budget constraint is una¤ected. In particular, several works use individual (non labor) incomes as distribution factors. If y 1 ; :::; y K is the vector of individual incomes and y = P a y a , while total income y is not a distribution factor (it enters the budget constraints), the (K 1) ratios y 1 =y; :::; y K 1 =y are. 5 In what follows, the vector of distribution factors will be denoted z = (z 1 ; :::; z S ); Pareto weights and collective indirect utilities, therefore, have the general form a (p; P; y; z) and V a (p; P; y; z).
Intrahousehold welfare: basic issues
We now consider individual welfare issues. We …rst consider a special case in which all commodities are privately consumed, then move to the general case.
The case of private goods
When all commodities are privately consumed, the household can be considered 
Conversely, for any non-negative functions 1 ; :::; K such that P k k (p; y; z) = y, an allocation that solves (D) for all a is Pareto-e¢ cient.
In words: in a private goods setting, any e¢ cient decision can be described as (or as if) a two-stage process. In the …rst stage, agents jointly decide on the 
where v a is the standard, indirect utility of agent a. In particular, we have the following result:
Proposition 3 When all commodities are privately consumed, then for any given price vector there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the sharing rule and the indirect utility
This result has two consequences. First, given each person's preferences, the sharing rule is a su¢ cient statistic for the entire decision process. Indeed, since all agents face the same prices, the sharing rule fully summarizes intrahousehold allocation of resources. As such, it is directly relevant for intrahousehold inequality. Second, and more importantly for our present purpose, the sharing rule is a money metric measure of individual utility. For given prices, a is an increasing transform of the collective indirect utility of person a; moreover, and unlike V a , it is measured in dollars.
Public and private commodities
Convenient as the previous notions may be, they still rely on a strong assumption -namely that all commodities are privately consumed. Relaxing this assumption is obviously necessary, if only because the existence of public consumption is one of the motives of household formation. We shall successively consider three possible extensions of the previous notion to the case of public goods.
Conditional sharing rule
A …rst generalization of the notion of sharing rule, the conditional sharing rule, is based on the following result:
Proposition 4 Assume an allocation Q; q 1 ; :::; q K is Pareto e¢ cient. Then there exists K non-negative functions ~ 1 ; :::;~ K of prices, total income and distribution factors, with P k~ k (p; P; y; z) = y P j P j Q j , such that for all a the vector of private consumptions q a solves: The conditional indirect utility is thus:
While the conditional sharing rule (CSR) is indeed a generalization of the sharing rule, three points must be noted. First, the existence of a conditional sharing rule is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency; that is, for any given level of public consumption, it is in general the case that almost all conditional sharing rules lead to ine¢ cient allocations. Speci…cally, a conditional sharing rule is compatible with e¢ ciency if and only if the standard, Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson conditions, which express the optimality of Q for these preferences, are satis…ed:
@Ṽ a (p; Q; a ) =@ a = P j ; j = 1; :::; N Second, the monotonic relationship between sharing rule and Pareto weights is lost. In particular, increasing a's weight does not necessarily result in a larger value for a . The intuition, here, is that giving more weight to one agent may result in a di¤erent allocation of public expenditures, which may or may not result in an increase in the agent's private consumption. In that sense, the generalization is only partial.
Third, and more importantly for our purpose, the conditional sharing rule may give a biased estimate of intrahousehold welfare allocation, because it simply disregards public consumption. That this pattern could be problematic is easy to see. Assume that one spouse (say the wife) cares a lot for a public good, while her husband cares very little. If the structure of household demand entails a signi…cant fraction of expenditures being devoted to that public good, one can expect this pattern to have an impact on any welfare measure within the household. Disregarding public consumption altogether is therefore not an adequate approach.
Public goods and Lindahl prices
An alternative approach to public consumption relies on the notion of Lindahl
prices. An old result in public economics states that, in the presence of public goods, Pareto e¢ cient allocations can be decentralized using personal prices that add up to the market price of the commodity. Formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 5 Assume an allocation Q; q 1 ; :::; q K is Pareto e¢ cient. Then there exists K non-negative functions 1 ; :::; K , with P k k = y, and N non-negative functions P a j ; a = 1; :::; K; j = 1; :::; N (where P a is a's vector of personal prices), with P a P a j = P j for all j, such that for all a the vector Q; q a solves:
Conversely, for any non-negative functions 1 ; :::; K such that P a a = y and P a j such that P a P a j = P j for all j, an allocation that solves (DP) for all a is Pareto-e¢ cient.
The vector = 1 ; :::; K de…nes a generalized sharing rule (GSR).
From an inequality perspective, this notion raises interesting issues. One could choose to adopt as a description of intrahousehold welfare allocation; indeed, agents now maximize utility under a budget constraint in which describes available income. In particular, is a much better indicator of the distribution of resources than the conditional sharing rule~ , because it takes into account both private and public consumptions.
However, the welfare of agent a is not fully described by a ; one also needs to know the vector P a of a's personal prices. Technically, the collective indirect utility of a is:
which depends on both a and P a . This implies that the sole knowledge of the GSR is not su¢ cient to recover the welfare level reached by a given agent, even if her preferences are known; indeed, one also needs to know the prices, which depend on all preferences.
In particular, welfare within the household cannot be analyzed from the sole knowledge of the generalized sharing rule. Agents now face di¤erent personal prices, and this should be taken into account. Of course, this conclusion was expected; it simply re ‡ects a basic but crucial insight -namely that if agents 'care di¤erently'about the public goods (as indicated by personal prices, which re ‡ect individual marginal willingnesses to pay), then variations in the quantity of these public goods have an impact on intrahousehold inequality.
The Money Metric Welfare Index
This leads us to the basic concept of Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI) of agent a. Formally:
The Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI) of agent a, m a (p; P; y; z), is de…ned by: v a (p; P; m a (p; P; y; z)) = V a (p; P; y; z)
Equivalently, if c a denotes the expenditure function of agent a;then: m a (p; P; y; z) = c a (p; P; V a (p; P; y; z))
In words, m a is the monetary amount that agent a would need to reach the utility level V a (p; P; y), if she was to pay the full price of each public good (i.e., if she faced the price vector P instead of the personalized prices P a ). The basic intuition is simple enough. The index is de…ned as the monetary amount that would be needed to reach the same utility level, at some reference prices; a natural benchmark is to use the current market price for all goods, private and public. Unlike the GSR, the Money Metric Welfare Index fully characterizes the utility level reached by the agent. That is, knowing an agent's preferences, there is a one-to-one relationship between her utility and her MMWI, and this relationship does not depend on the partner's characteristics.
Three remarks can be made at this point. First, in the absence of public goods, the MMWI coincides with the sharing rule. In other words, the MMWI is a fully general measure of individual welfare, which coincides with the natural concept (i.e. the sharing rule) in the (largely explored) case of private consumptions, and extends it to allow for public expenditures within the household.
A second remark is that in the presence of public goods, the MMWI depends on the price vector for public goods used as a reference. While using the market price as a benchmark is a natural solution, it is by no means the only one. Even more striking is the fact that even the direction of intrahousehold inequality may be a¤ected by this choice; i.e., one can easily construct examples in which the MMWI of member A is larger than B's for some prices but smaller for others (see Figure 1 ). 6 Lastly, there is a direct relationship between the MMWI and the standard notion of equivalent income. 7 Both approaches rely on the notion that refering to a common price vector can facilitate interpersonal comparisons of welfare.
However, to the best of our knowledge, equivalent income has exclusively be applied so far to private goods. Our point, here, is that using the concept of Lindahl prices allows to extend it to the case of public comsumption, thus providing a natural solution to a recurrent and somewhat di¢ cult problem.
An example
The previous concepts can be illustrated on a very simple example. Assume two agents a and b, two commodities -one private q, one public Q -and Cobb- 6 We thanks Frederic Vermeulen for suggesting this example. 7 See f.i. Fleurbaey (forthcoming) for a recent survey.
Douglas preferences:
corresponding to the indirect utilities: and we conclude that member b is much better o¤ than a.
2. This conclusion is clearly unsatisfactory, because it disregards the fact that half the budget is spent on the public good, which bene…ts a more than b. Indeed, the GSR is
and we conclude that for this indicator, the household is perfectly equal:
the bene…ts of public expenditures exactly compensate di¤erences in private consumptions.
3. The later conclusion is however too optimistic, since it omits the fact that a 'pays' twice as much for the public good than b does (here, P a = Individual MMWIs add up to more than total income, re ‡ecting the gain generated by the publicness of one commodity.
Extensions
We now consider a few extensions of the model
Private goods with individual-speci…c prices
Interesting issues arise when, within the same household, individuals face di¤er-ent prices for some good. A typical example is leisure: its (opportunity) price is the wage, which is individual-speci…c. The previous approach applies in that case as well. Speci…cally, consider a standard, collective model of labor supply with private consumption, as in Chiappori (1992) . Individual utilities are of
, where L denotes leisure and q is the consumption of some Hicksian aggregate good. Let w a denote member a's wage, y the household's (total) non labor income, and de…ne Y to be the household total (or potential)
income:
where T denotes total time available. Consider a couple in which husband and wife have identical levels of leisure and commodity consumption but di¤erent wages (say, his wage is higher). Then our criterion concludes that the intrahousehold allocation is unequal in the husband's favor, because, although the number of hours of leisure is the same, the value of his consumption of leisure is larger. This conclusion is, in a sense, unavoidable if one wants to consider a 'general'measure of consumption that also includes leisure. Aggregating various consumptions requires relative prices, and there is no compelling reason for not using market prices. But then the value of one hour of leisure equals the person's wage; there is little justi…cation for departing from this benchmark.
It should however be noted that this approach may be seen as contradicting the notion of equivalent income -which would require using the same 'price'
(here wage) as a common benchmark. The contradiction, however, is largely super…cial. Using the same reference wage for the husband and the wife is needed only to the extent one considers male and female leisure as the same commodity (which happens to be priced di¤erently depending on gender). While this assumption may sometimes be acceptable (say, if both spouses have exactly the same human capital and exert exactly the same task with the same productivity, so that the wage di¤erence is exclusively due to gender discrimination), one would expect such cases to be the exception. Most of the time, husband and wife have di¤erent jobs, and there would be little rationale to imposing these jobs to be priced equally.
Finally, it is clear that the measure of welfare thus de…ned will be sensitive to the de…nition of leisure. This raises two speci…c problems. One is the choice of total available time T : a larger value of T in ‡ates the evaluation of time spent on leisure, which increases total consumption of all members, but increases more that of higher wage individuals. Second, and more important, is the issue of domestic production. If, as seems natural, we include leisure in our assessment of total consumption, then the distinction between 'true'leisure and other uses of available time (including chores and other forms of household production) becomes crucial. This issue is considered below.
Changes in marital status
One of the main advantages of the collective approach, as opposed to unitary models, is that it allows to model member's preferences both within and outside the relationship (say, before marriage or after divorce) within the same basic framework. Still, an important question is the relationship between the two sets of preferences. Various models make di¤erent assumptions on this issue. parents'preferences regarding their own consumption does not depend on the number of children. These approaches are described in the next subsection.
Domestic production
The general notion of domestic production covers a host of di¤erent situations.
Rural households typically have an explicit production activity, the outcomes of which can be self consumed or sold on a market; in low income countries, The technology is described by a production function that gives the possible vector of outputs (q; Q) that can be produced given a vector of market purchases
x (and possibly the time = ( a ; a = 1; K) spent in household production by each of the members). It takes the general form:
while individual utilities are now U a (q a ; Q) for a = 1; :::; K.
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For clarity purposes, it is useful to start with case when all produced goods are privately consumed within the household, then move to the general case.
Private goods only
We start with the case N = 0; moreover, we …rst disregard the time spent by each member on domestic production. This setting is thus identical to the general model of household production of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2003) . 9 Pareto e¢ ciency translates into the program: 8 The setting just described is identical to the general model of household production of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2003) . For empirical applications, these authors use a linear technology a la Barten. 9 For empirical applications, these authors use a linear technology a la Barten. 
or equivalently the cost minimization one:
In that case, again, individual welfare is adequately measured by the sharing rule.
Extending this model to domestic labor supply is straightforward. The
Pareto program is now:
Prices for internally produced goods are de…ned as before; the sharing rule is now:
where L a denotes a's optimal leisure. The program can be decentralized as 
Private and public goods
We now consider the general case where produced goods can be private or public.
With the same notations as above, the program is now:
As before, we may de…ne the shadow price of a produced good as the ratio of the Lagrange multiplier of the corresponding production constraint to the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. But decentralization now involves Lindahl prices for the public goods; i.e., person a's program is now:
Here, a is the Generalized Sharing Rule, and a j is a's personal price for public good j; these may satisfy X a a j = j where j is the shadow price of public good j. Lastly, the MMWIs can be de…ned as above; the de…nition (3) must simply be replaced with: m a (p; P; y; z) = c a ( ; ; V a ( ; ; y; z))
Extending this formula to domestic time is straightforward.
Identi…cation: some remarks
While the conceptual tools just presented help clarifying some of the issues involved, their empirical content must be carefully considered: these is no point putting much emphasis on a concept that cannot possibly be identi…ed form existing data. In fact, much progress has recently been made on these issues. In this section, we brie ‡y summarize some of the main results. For a detailed presentation, the reader is referred to Chiappori and Ekeland (2009b) and Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2014).
We start with the 'pure' identi…cation problem. Assume that the entire demand function of a household can be observed; what can be recovered from such data (and such data only)? A …rst result, due to Chiappori and Ekeland (2009a) , is that under mild regularity conditions, one exclusion restriction per agent is su¢ cient to fully identify the collective, indirect utilities. The exclusion restriction, here, requires that for each agent there exists a least one commodity that is not consumed by this agent. The result is local; in particular, it does not require global constraints (such as non negativity restrictions). Moreover, the presence of distribution factors would allow a stronger identi…cation result.
Speci…cally, the exclusion requirement can then be relaxed; one only need the presence of an assignable commodity. Private goods, however, raise speci…c di¢ culties. Remember that, in that case, the various concepts (conditional sharing rule, generalized sharing rule, money metric welfare index) coincide with the sharing rule, and the collective indirect utility takes the form:
where, as above, v a is a's indirect utility and is the sharing rule. Under assumptions stated above, the function V a is identi…ed. The sharing rule, however, is not; identi…cation only obtains up to an additive function of the prices of the non exclusive goods. The corresponding indetermination is not welfare relevant, since the di¤erent solutions correspond to the same collective indirect utilities for each agent. In that case, and somewhat paradoxically, one can identify intra-household welfare distribution (although only up to the usual restrictions: one can only identify individual utilities in an ordinal sense), but not income distribution.
member is independently observed.
It is crucial to remark, however, that this non identi…cation result is only local. In particular, it disregards additional, global restrictions such as non negativity contraints. If these are added, then more precise identi…cation obtains.
For instance, adding a non negativity restriction exactly pins down the sharing rule in general. This result should be related to recent work on the estimation of the sharing rules based on a revealed preference approach (see for instance
Cherchye et al 2012). Since the revealed preference approach is global by nature, it can generate bounds on the sharing rule, which can actually be quite narrow.
In all cases, the global restrictions are generated at one end of the distribution of expenditures, so their use for identifying the sharing rule outside this range should be submitted to the usual caution. Still, they tend to considerably reduce the scope of the non identi…cation conclusion. 
Conclusion
In the paper, we propose a systematic view of issues related to welfare within the household. We argue that any such analysis should be based on the notion of individual welfare; i.e., it should consider the well-being of each individual within the household. This raises conceptual and empirical di¢ culties. On the conceptual side, the main issue is to account for the public nature of some consumptions and for the presence of household production. We suggest that the concept of Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI), which can be viewed as a generalization of the notion of equivalent income, is an adequate response to these concerns. On the empirical side, while some (and possibly most) individual consumptions are not observable, recent progress in the collective literature allows one to actually recover these concepts from data on household behavior under relatively mild conditions (typically exclusion restrictions for at least one commodity per agent). All in all, the tools exist for shifting our perspective from household to individual welfare. We expect future empirical work to follow this promising direction.
